Comments

INNOCUOUS INOCULUM OR PERILOUS
PARASITE? ENCOURAGING GENETIC
RESEARCH THROUGH PATENT
GRANTS: A CALL FOR
REGULATION AND DEBATE

This Comment examines the effect of the United States Supreme
Court's Diamond v. Chakrabarty decision on researchin recombinant genetics. Although the Supreme Court has recited its inability to deny patents for microorganisms, the Comment suggests
several grounds for refusing to extend patentprotection to products of genetic research,not least among which is the danger such
researchposes to public health, morals, and well-being. Concluding that the Supreme Court's decision will encourage genetic research that is not currently subject to government safety
guidelines, the Comment callsfor congressional action to govern
such research and suggests several regulatory schemes.

INTRODUCTION
The Constitution authorizes Congress "[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."' Accordingly, since 1790, Congress has
enacted a number of Patent Acts.2 The 1952 Act 3 gives the patent
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause has been interpreted to grant Congress the authority to establish a patent system. See Note, Ounership of Living
Inventions-In re Bergy, 29 Da PAuL I. REV. 215, 215 n.2 (1979).
2. For a discussion of patent acts from the earliest act of April 10, 1790, to the
March 1981

Vol. 18

No. 2

holder a seventeen year monopoly, enabling the holder to prevent
4
others from making, using or selling the invention.
The primary purpose of the patent system has been stated to be
the encouragement of technological advancement, 5 rather than reward to the individual inventor.6 The system is foremost a device
that serves the public by promoting inventions that benefit society in a tangible way. The system is not intended to promote
"pure science" in and of itself; but only those "useful Arts" of
practical value to the public. 7 This excludes inventions which are

"frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or morals of
society."8
In Diamondv. Chakrabarty,9 the United States Supreme Court
recognized genetic research potentially poses serious threats to
society.' 0 Nevertheless, the Court refused to consider these dangers. Reasoning that the denial of patents for microorganisms is
not likely to stop genetic research, the Court passed to Congress
the burden of evaluating the competing values and interests involved in encouraging such research." Part I of this Comment
examines the basis of the Supreme Court's decision. Part II discusses the propriety of extending patent grants for products of genetic research before establishing a regulatory system for such
last major act of 1952 see 1 A. DELLER, DEER'S WALKER ON PATENTS 85-100 (2d ed.

1964).
3. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376

(1976)).

4. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976).
5. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchermical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1945).
'"The constitutionally stated purpose for enacting the patent system is the promotion of progress in the 'useful Arts' rather than in 'Science'. This was the conclusion of both houses of Congress in enacting the 1952 Patent Act .... The term
'useful Arts' now refers to 'technological arts."' Note, Oumership of Living Inventions-In re Bergy, 29 DE PAUL L. REv. 215, 215 n.2 (1979).
6. The scope of the patent claim has reached beyond what a reward to the
individual would require. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the PatentSystem, 20
J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977).
7. Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., 154 F. 358 (7th
Cir. 1907). The patent system is an incentive system that operates primarily on
business men and secondarily on inventors to encourage the supply of new devices useful to the public. Dienner, Patentsfor Biological Specimens and Products, 35 J.PAT. OFF.Soc'Y 286 (1953). Congress balanced the economic interests of
the inventor with public interests in designing the patent statutes. Note, The Patentability of Living Matter: Hey Waiter, What's ChakrabartysPseudomonas Bacterium Doing Back in the Supreme Court's Soup?, 37 WAsE. & LEE L. REV. 183

(1980).
8. Note, The Patentabilityof Living Organisms Under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In re
Bergy, 58 NEB. L. REv. 303, 305 (1978) (quoting Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F.Cas. 1018
(C.C.Mass. 1817) (No. 8,568)).
9. 100 S.Ct. 2204 (1980).
10. 100 S.Ct. at 2211.
11. 100 S.Ct. at 2211-12.
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research and without the opportunity for public debate. Part III
suggests possible congressional action to resolve any conflicting
interests or policies.
THE FRAMEWORK

Statutory Limitations on Patentability
The subject matter for which a patent may be obtained is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 101.12 Because patents deal with inventions,
which are by nature things previously unknown, the classes of
patentable subject matter in section 101 were defined in very
broad and general terms.13 Broad statutory requirements of "utility" and "statutory subject matter" are set out in section 101.14 A
novelty determination is made under section 102.15 Section 103

codifies a judicially created nonobviousness limitation. 16

12. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) provides: "Whoever invents or discovers any new

and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new
and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."
13. These statutory vagaries are occasionally a source of controversy, especially when, as in Chakrabarty,the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) must determine for the first time that an invention constitutes statutory subject matter
under § 101.
14. This section has been interpreted as stating three requirements for patentability: novelty, utility, and statutory subject matter. See Note, Ownership of Living Inventions-In re Bergy, 29 DE PAUL L. REV. 218 (1979). But see note 15 infra.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). The PTO has consistently applied § 102 in making
rejections for lack of novelty. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 961 (C.C.P.A. 1979). In only
two cases has the novelty rejection been made under § 101. See In re Bergstrom,
427 F.2d 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Seaborg, 328 F.2d 996 (C.C.P.A. 1964). The in-

ventor or discoveror must be the first to invent or discover the subject of the patent claim in substantially the same manner as it was invented. This
determination requires a comparison With the "prior art." "Prior art" is
"[a] nything in tangible form that may properly be relied on by the Patent Office
under the Patent Statutes and the Patent Office Rules of Practice in Patent Cases
in support of rejection on matter of substance, not form, of a claim in a pending
application for patent"

5 A. DELLER, DELLERs'S WALKER ON PATENTS 361 (2d ed.

1964) (emphasis in original). The determination of "prior art" by the courts is
sometimes quite arbitrary. See note 75 and accompanying text infra.
16. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). "Section 103 is a restatement of the rule invalidating
patents for lack of invention or lack of patentable novelty which has long been recognized by the courts and other authorities but [had] not before been spelled out
in the statute." Zinn, Commentary on New Title 35, U.S. Code "Patents",U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 2507, 2513 (1952). Under § 103, a patent will be allowed
only "if the difference between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art [is] such that the subject matter as a whole [would not] have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person ordinarily skilled in the art."
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).

Section 112 of the Patent Act is particularly important in determining the patentability of living matter.' 7 That section requires
a written description of the subject matter of the patent sufficiently detailed to enable one skilled in the art to make and use
the invention.
Judicially Created Limitations on Patentability
The patent statutes' requirements do not provide the only limitations on patentability. While the courts have broadly construed
the possible classes of patentable subject matter, they have also
delineated certain subjects that fall outside the purview of patent
coverage. For example, the subject of a patent claim is not patentable where its novelty consists merely of an arrangement of
printed matter,'18 a phenomenon of nature,' 9 methods of doing
business, 20 mental steps, 2 1 or mathematical formulae or algorithms.22
One frequently stated judicially created 23 limitation is that a
"product of nature" cannot be patented. 24 This "product of nature" doctrine dates back at least to 1889.25 For seventy-five years
or more the doctrine was invoked by both the Patent and Trade17. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1980) provides in pertinent part-

The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to
which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and
use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
The application of this section to living organisms has been the matter of some
controversy. See notes 110-11 and accompanying text infra.
18. Conover v. Coe, 99 F.2d 377 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
19. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); O'Reilly
v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
20. In re Chatfleld, 545 F.2d 152, 157 (C.C.P.A 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S 875
(1977).
21. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682 (C.C.P-.A 1971), rev'd sub nom. Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
22. In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P. 1977), rev'd sub nom. Parker v. Flook, 437
U.S. 584 (1978).
23. See Note, Living Matter Found to be Patentable: In re Chakrabarty, 11
CONN. L. REV. 311 (1979); Note, The Patentabilityof Living Organisms Under 35
U.S.C. § 101: In re Bergy, 58 NEB. L. REV. 303, 307 (1978).
24. A "product of nature" has been variously defined as "a naturally occurring
element, composition of matter or substance that can be found in and extracted
from minerals or living organisms." Guttag, The Patentabilityof Microorganisms:
Statutory Subject Matterand Other Living Things, 13 U. RicH. L. REV. 247, 252 n.27
(1979), and as "one occurring on the earth in a form that has not been changed by
any act of a human being." 47 MIca. L. REV. 391, 395 (1949).
25. See Ex parte Latimer, 46 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1638 (1889).
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mark Office (PTO) and the courts to invalidate various patent
6
claims without reference to specific statutory authority.2
A second, distinct, judicially created limitation is the "phenomenon of nature" doctrine.2 7 In order for an invention which embodies a phenomenon of nature to be patentable, its development
must have required more than the ordinary skill of a person in
the art or profession, given the state of the "prior art" when the
subject matter was developed. 28 Fundamental to the doctrine is
the principle that the phenomena are neither "inventions" nor
"discoveries" as defined by the Patent Act.29 All phenomena of
nature, even if newly discovered, are treated as well-known aspects of the "prior art." Therefore, the phenomenon of nature
doctrine precludes from patentability the phenomenon itself together with its fundamental applications. 30
One commentator has noted that the courts have used the
26. See Behringer, Germ Warfare in the Patent Courts?, 31 HATrmGS .J. 883,
895 n.86 (1980). The doctrine was first assumed to be an interpretation of § 101:
that products of nature were not "new" and therefore not patentable subject matter under the section. See, e.g., Ex parte Siddiqui, 156 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 426 (PTO
Bd. App. 1966); Jacob, Patentabilityof Natural Products,52 J. PAT. OFT. Soc'y 473
(1970). The C.C.P-.A rejected that analysis, contending that the product of nature
doctrine was an expression of the novelty requirements of § 102. See Behringer,
supra, at 896.
While certain decisions have professed to rely on the C.C.P.'s analysis, consideration of the facts suggest that the actual basis of the holdings lay elsewhere.
Guttag, supra note 24, at 252. In view of the difficulties in applying the product of
nature doctrine, some courts have rejected it, id. at 253; see, e.g., Merck & Co. v.
Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 253 F.2d 156 (4th Cir. 1958), revg, 152 F. Supp. 690
(W.D. Va. 1957); Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford Co., 189 F. 95 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1911), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 196 F. 496 (2d Cir. 1912), while others have attempted to establish a distinction based on purification of the naturally occurring
material. See Guttag, supra note 24, at 254-55 for a discussion of the failure of the
courts to reconcile the "product of nature" doctrine with the "purification of naturally occurring substance" treatments.
In recent cases, the C.C.P. has left open the question of whether a product of
nature rejection is proper when the claimed material existed unrecognized in nature. See, e.g., In re Kratz, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 71 (C.C.P.
1979). The court noted
that support for such a rejection can be found only in dicta, id. at 75, but held that
"products of nature" may be patentable when the other requirements for patentability are met. See generally Note, Living Matter Found to be Patentable: In re
Chakrabarty, 11 CoNN.L. REV.311, 318-19 (1979).
27. Note, supra note 7, at 185-86. Exactly what constitutes a "phenomenon of
nature" is unclear. See note 33 infra.
28. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 132 (1948);
Armour Pharm. Co. v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 396 F.2d 70, 74 (3d Cir. 1968).
29. See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978).
30. Note, supra note 7, at 187.

terms "phenomenon of nature," "laws of nature," "principles of
nature," and "fundamental truths" synonymously.3 1 All of these
terms are poorly defined. They are "vague and malleable terms
infected with too much ambiguity and equivocation." 3 2 Such ambiguity allows the courts great discretion in the application of the
doctrine, 33 and its use or rejection has at times been arbitrary or
unexplained.

34

Despite the great discretion exercised by the courts in applying
judicially created limitations, the courts have claimed that they

do not expand the law; they merely interpret the congressional intent underlying the patent statute. 3 One commentator has disputed this claim. 36 He concludes that in determining patentable
subject matter, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(C.C.P.A.) has tried to expand the scope of section 101 by
"judicial fiat,13 7 not by statutory interpretation.
MicroorganismPatent Claims in the Courts
The courts use a two-step analysis in affording patent protection to microorganisms; (1) the patent statutes allow patents for
31. Id. at 188 n.31.
32. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 135 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
33. The doctrine has been applied to exclude patents embodying the followingphysical laws of nature, such as gravity, (but see Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont.
Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923) (A machine with one end elevated was held to embody a phenomenon of nature. Id. at 52. The machine was held patentable. Id. at
69-70. Later courts have recognized that the use of the phenomenon was inventive.
See, e.g., Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 590)); physical properties of nature, such as
heat of the sun and electricity, (see Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333
U.S. at 130) (recognizing that heat of the sun and electricity are phenomena of nature); "inherent physical properties of naturally occurring animate and inanimate
matter," (id. noninhibitive properties in strains of bacteria held phenomenon of
nature); Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 155, 175-76 (1852) (properties of lead).
The scope of this class of phenomena is not well defined due to the imprecise definition of the term "inherent properties." Previous decisions concerning this class
of phenomena indicate that it includes properties exhibited only under conditions
not found in nature. See, e.g., Davison Chem. Corp. v. Joliet Chems., Inc., 179 F.2d
793, 795 (7th Cir. 1950) (property demonstrated only at extremely high temperatures); In re Arnold, 185 F.2d 686, 691 (C.C.P.A. 1950) (property demonstrated only
when molecules subjected to extremely high frequency electricity)); and mathematical equations and methods of calculation, (see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 595
n.18). Note, supra note 7, at 188-89.
34. See, e.g., In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 965 (C.C.P.A. 1979). The Bergy majority
held that the claim for a biologically pure culture of a bacterium found in nature
did not involve phenomena of nature, thereby making the doctrine inapplicable.
The court failed to give any explanation to support its determination.
35. This is based on the courts' duty to decide cases of first impression
through an exercise of discretion in interpreting the statute. Id. at 984-87.
36. Note, Patenting the Microorganism In re Bergy, The First Step up the
Chain of Life, 2 GEO. MASON U.L. REv. 265, 276 (1978).
37. Id. at 277-78.
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claims to processes using microorganisms 38 and to compositions
39
containing microorganisms in admixture with inanimate matter,
and (2) the patent statutes do not expressly bar microorganism
patents.40 This analysis has been challenged on the grounds that
there is a distinction between processes using living organisms or
inoculums containing living organisms and the living organisms
alone,4 1 and that the Plant Patent Act of 193042 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 197043 indicate that no living organism is patThese basic lines of
entable outside of their provisions. 4
reasoning were followed by the lower courts deciding In re
38. See, e.g., Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 159 F.
453, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 209 U.S. 548 (1908); Ex parte Prescott, 19 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 178 (PTO Bd. App. 1932).
39. U.S. PATENT AND TRADEmAmU OFFICE, MANUAL OF CLASSMhCATION 424-1
(1979) (Class 71, subclass 6 (fertilizer compositions containing bacteria); Class 195,
subclass 59 (fermentation products containing live bacteria); Class 424, subclass 93
(drugs containing whole live bacteria).
40. Guttag, supra note 24.
41. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Union Solvents Corp., 54 F.2d
400 (D. Del. 1931), aff'd per curiam, 61 F.2d 1041 (3d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288
U.S. 614 (1933). In upholding the patent of the Weizmarm process for the production of acetone and butyl alcohol by bacterial fermentation the court made the following observation in dicta:
Lastly, the defendant contends that the invention of the Weizmann patent is unpatentable since it is for the life process of a living organism.
Were the patent for bacteria per se, a different situation would be
presented. As before stated, the patent is not for bacteria per se. It is for
a fermentation process employing bacteria ....
54 F.2d at 410. Cf.Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
(The Kalo Court simply assumed that a mixed inoculant of non-inhibitive strains
of bacteria constituted statutory subject matter. The Court's decision to grant the
patent was based on the ground that the mixed inoculant was a '"patentable advance" within the meaning of the statute.) Guttag, spra note 24, at 261.
42. 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1976).
43. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1976).
44. At least one court has assumed, in dictum, that plants were not within the
patent laws until the Plant Patent Act was enacted. Yoder Bros. Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347, 1377 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1094 (1977). The best argument for the proposition that plants (or any other living
organisms) were not patentable prior to 1930 can be found in a transitory provision which precluded patent protection for plants prior to May 23, 1930. Plant Patent Act of 1930, ch. 312, § 5, 46 Stat. 376. It has been argued that the restrictive
terms of the Plant Patent Act, allowing patent protection only for asexually reproducing plants, indicate that Congress intended the Act to be exclusive of other
plants and other organisms, Note, Patentingthe Microorganism: In re Bergy, The
First Step up the Chain of Life, 2 GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 265, 272 (1978), and that,
had living matter been otherwise patentable, the Plant Patent Act would have
been unnecessary. See, e.g., In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 999 (C.C.PJ.A 1979) (Miller,
J., dissenting). The 1970 Act extended patent protection for certain sexually producing plant varieties. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2583 (1976).

4
6 the two cases preceding the
Bergy 45 and In re Chakrabarty,
Supreme Court's decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.47
Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty, a microbiologist working for the General Electric Company,48 genetically engineered a new strain of
bacteria of the genus Pseudomonas capable of degrading several
hydrocarbon components of crude oil.49 Chakrabarty's patent application contained thirty-six claims, divisible into four groups.O
The Patent Office Examiner allowed the two groups that claimed
a process incorporating the bacteria.5 ' He rejected, however, the
two groups directed at the bacterium itself, or at an inoculum consisting essentially of the bacteria,5 2 on the ground that they
5 3
claimed a nonpatentable product of nature.

45. Ex parte Bergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 78 (PTO Bd. App. 1976), rev'd sub
nom. In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977), vacated and remanded, 438 U.S.
902 (1978), affid, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.), cert. granted, 444 U.S. 924 (1979), vacated
as moot, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980).
46. In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.PA. 1978), cert. dismissed sub nom.
Banner v. Chakrabarty, 439 U.S. 801 (1978), affid on rehearing sub nom. In re
Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979), affid sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S.
Ct. 2204 (1980).
47. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980).
48. General Electric was the real party in interest as the assignee of Dr.
Chakrabarty's interest in the patent application. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 956
(C.C.P.A. 1979).
49. In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 41-43 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The new strain of microorganism was created by transmitting four plasmids into an existing strain of
Pseudomonas aeruginosa. While the existing strains -had limited ability to degrade crude oil components, each of the four transmitted plasmids contained
degradative pathways capable of converting the oil to a normal food substance of
the bacterium in which they were placed, thus making the new organism capable
of digesting various oil components. The microorganisms have valuable potential
for cleaning-up oil spills. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 969; Cripps, Genetic Engineering-A Problem For the Patent Offwe?, 1979 NEw ZEALAND L.. 232, 233.
For an explanation of the "gene splicing" process used by Dr. Chakrabarty see
Baker & Clough, The Technological Uses and Methodology of Recombinant DNA,
51 S. CAL. L. R.v. 1009 (1978).
One commentator has suggested that, "[1]ike Dr. Frankenstein, Dr. Chakrabarty
created a living thing." Note, The Patentabilityof Living Organisms Under 35
U.S.C. § 101: Parker v. Bergy (Parker v. Chakrabarty), 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 379,
392 (1980). This is clearly mistaken. Dr. Chakrabarty did not instill life into inanimate matter, he merely transferred certain "organic" structures into an already
living organism. The issue in the case is not properly the patentability of "life" or
"aliveness," but the patentability of a novel, genetically developed species. See
Note, The Patentabilityof Living Organisms Under 35 U.S.C. § 101. In re Bergy, 91
HARv. L. REV. 1357, 1361-62 (1978).
50. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 970 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
51. Claims 27, 28, and 29 comprised a group directed at a process, or improvement in a process, of transferring plasmids from a donor to a recipient bacterium.
Id. Claims 30, 31, 32, 35, and 36 comprised a group directed at an inoculated medium constituting a carrier material able to float on water (straw). Id. at 970-71.
52. The claims for the bacterium were Claims 7, 8, 9, 13, 15, 17, and 21. Id.
Those for the inoculum were Claims 21, 24, 25, and 26. Id. at 970.
53. Id. at 971.
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On appeal, the PTO Board of Appeals erroneously interpreted
the Examiner's rejection as stating two grounds for nonpatentability of the latter two groups of claims: 54 that the organism was
a product of nature and that the organism was a living thing. The

Board reversed the Examiner on the first ground,; but upheld
the rejection on the second ground, reasoning that the Plant Pat56
ent Act excluded living organisms as patentable subject matter.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) reversed
the Board and held that neither case law nor statutes could be interpreted to exclude living organisms from patentability under
section 101.57 Chief Judge Markey, speaking for the C.C.P.A., observed: "No Congressional intent to limit patents to dead [sic] inventions lurks in the lacuna of the statute, and there is no grave
or compelling circumstance requiring us to find it there."5 8 Judge
Markey reasoned that the modified bacteria fell within the meaning of the terms "manufacture" or "composition of matter." He
argued that there are but two sources of manufactures and compositions of matter: nature and man. Because the organism was
a "manufacture" of man, Judge Markey concluded that it was
within the statutory subject matter and to find otherwise would
"defeat the fundamental purpose of the Constitution and of the
Patent laws enacted thereunder." 59 While the PTO was appealing
the C.C.P.A.'s Chakrabarty decision, the Supreme Court remanded the Bergy case to the C.C.P.A. for rehearing in light of
Parkerv. Flook.60
In Light of Parker v. Flook
In Flook the applicant sought a patent for a method of updating
54. Note, Ownership of Living Inventions-In re Bergy, 29 DE PAUL L. REV.
215, 222 (1979).

55. This ground, while justifiable in Bergy, was clearly inapplicable in this
case as Chakrabarty's strain of the Pseudomonas bacterium presumably does not
exist undiscovered in nature. The Board used analysis similar to that used in
Bergy to conclude that the product of nature doctrine was inapplicable. In re
Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d at 42.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
Id. at 44.
Id.
437 U.S. 584 (1978). Because Bergy and Chakrabarty both involved a de-

termination of the patentability of a microorganism the C.C.PA. vacated its
Chakrabarty decision and consolidated the two cases for reargument. In re
Bergy, 596 F.2d at 957.

alarm limits during catalytic conversion processes. The patent
claims rested on a mathematical formula or algorithm.61 The
Supreme Court rejected the patent claims, based on its earlier decision in Gottschalk v. Benson, 62 that novel and useful mathematical formulae are merely ideas, and that ideas are not patentable
63
subject matter.
In a frequently cited passage, 64 the Flook Court argued in favor
of judicial restraint and narrow construction of the patent statutes
and case law. 65 The language of that passage and the Court's ac-

tion in summarily vacating and remanding Bergy for reconsideration in light of Flook seem to show some reluctance to extend
patent protection to new technologies.6 6 Unfortunately, the Court
issued no clear directives indicating what bearing Flook had on
Bergy. 67
The C.C.P.A., considering Bergy on remand with Chakrabarty,
decided the only thing the two cases had in common with Flook
was that they all involved section 101.68 This is an overly narrow

reading of the Flook opinion. It was a matter of some concern
and confusion for the Flook Court that the applicant did not seek
to patent the algorithm, but only one limited application of it.69
The Court stated that it is "clear that a process is not unpatent61. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 584 (1978).
62. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
63. Id. at 72.
64. 437 U.S. at 596. See, e.g., Note, The Patentability of Living Organisms
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: Parker v.Bergy (Parker v.Chakrabarty), 15 NEW ENG. L.
REV.379, 390 (1980).
65. The Court said:
It is our duty to construe the patent statutes as they now read, in light
of our prior precedents, and we must proceed cautiously when we are
asked to extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress.
[WJe should not expand patent rights by overruling or modifying
our prior cases construing the patent statutes, unless the argument
for expansion of privilege is based on more than mere inference from
ambiguous statutory language. We would require a clear and certain
signal from Congress ....
437 U.S. at 596 (quoting Deepsouth Packing Co. Inc. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518,
531 (1972)).
66. Note,The Patentabilityof Living Organisns Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: Parker
v. Bergy (Parker v. Chakrabarty), 15 NEw ENG. L.REV. 379, 389 (1980).
67. Note, Ownership of Living Inventions-In re Bergy, 29 DE PAUL I REV.
215, 225 (1979).
68. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979). The C.C.P.A. noted that vhile
Flook (and Benson) concerned rejected process claims, the process clains in
Bergy and Chakrabarty had been approved. The court also pointed out that the
Flook holding had been limited to improved methods of calculation. Id. at 964.
69. See notes 71-73 and accompanying text infra. Ina footnote the Court lamented "it is not entirely clear why a process claim is any more or less patentable
because the specific end use contemplated is the only one for which the algorithm
has any practical application." Parker v. Flock, 437 U.S. at 590 n.11. The Court also
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able simply because it contains a law of nature or a mathematical
algorithm." Nevertheless, "[t]he process itself, not merely the
70
mathematical algorithm, must be new and useful."
The applicant in Flook argued that his claims differed from
those in Benson because he intended to use the formula in a limited way71 and did not seek to preempt the use of the algorithm.72
The Court rejected this distinction,73 citing O'Reilly v. Morse7 4 for
the rule that a mathematical algorithm or a law of nature is always treated as though it were a familiar part of the prior art.75

The C.C.P.A. found that the Supreme Court's admonition in
Flook calling for caution and restraint 76 pertained only to "territorial" patent rights, not subject matter, and as such did not apply
to Bergy or Chakrabarty.77 The C.C.PA. therefore upheld the
78
patent claims in both actions.
Diamond v. Chakrabarty79
A divided Supreme Court affirmed the C.C.PA.'s holding that
pointed out that "It]he line between a patentable 'process' and an unpatentable
'principle' is not always clear." Id. at 589.
70. Id. at 590.
71. Id. at 589-90. In rejecting the claim for the algorithm in Benson the
Supreme Court relied on the fact that the claim was "so abstract and sweeping as
to cover both known and unknown uses ...

,"

Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at

68, so as to wholly preempt the use of the formula. Id. at 71-72.
72. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589-90; Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71-72.
73. 437 U.S. at 590.
74. 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853).
75. This is true "[w]hether the algorithm was in fact known or unknown at the
time of the claimed invention." 437 U.S. at 591-92 (citing O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 62, 115 (1853)). See notes 27-30 and accompanying text supra.
76. See notes 64-67 and accompanying text supra.
77. 'The patent statute grants to the patentee the right to exclude others from
making, using, or selling the subject matter of the invention throughout the United
States." 8 A. DELLER, DE.LLER'S WALKER ON PATENrrs 223 (2d ed. 1964); In re Bergy,
596 F.2d at 966. The C.C.P-.A stated that while the territorial jurisdiction of patent
protection is fixed by statute and case law, the subject matter covered is open to
interpretation by the courts. Thus it characterized In re Bergy as a case of first
impression. See Note, The Patentability of Living Organiss Under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101: Parker v. Bergy (Parker v. Chakrabarty), 15 NEw ENG. I REV. 379, 391
(1980).
78. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 987.
79. 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980). Following the C.C.PA.'s decision in Bergy, the PTO
sought certiorari. This was granted as to both Bergy and Chakrabarty. Id. at 261
(1980). A number of commentators, apparently agreeing with Judge Miller's
dissent in Bergy, argued that the Supreme Court should refrain from hearing the
case pending congressional guidance. See, e.g., Guttag, supra note 24; Note,
Patenting the Microorganism" In re Bergy, The First Step up the Chain of Life, 2

Chakrabarty's bacterium was patentable. 80 The decision was
based on two grounds. First, "in choosing such expansive terms
as 'manufacture' and 'composition of matter,' modified by the
comprehensive 'any,' Congress plainly contemplated the patent
laws would be given wide scope;" and the courts should not read
into the patent laws limitations that Congress has not expressed. 81 Second, although "laws of nature, physical phenomenon, and abstract ideas have been held not patentable,"
Chakrabarty's claim speaks to none of these "but to a nonnaturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter-a
product of human ingenuity, 'having a distinctive name, character
82
[and] use"' with "the potential for significant utility."

The Court rejected the two arguments raised by the Patent Office. 83 The Court held the Plant Patent Act and Plant Variety Pro84
tection Act inapplicable to microorganism patent claims.

stressed the lack of ambiguity

85

It

in the broad terms of the patent

GEO. MASON U.L. REV. 265 (1978); Note, The Patentability of Living Organisms
Under 35 U.S.C § 101: In re Bergy, 91 HAnv. L REV. 1357 (1978); Note, The
Patentabilityof Living Organisms Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: In re Bergy, 58 NEB. I.
REV. 303 (1978); Note, The PatentabilityofLiving Organisms Under 35 U.S.C. § 101:
Parker v. Bergy (Parker v. Chakrabarty), 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 379 (1980); Note,
Patentabilityof Micro-Organisms: Legal Control of Life, 47 U. Mo. KAN.CrTY L.
REV. 130 (1978). Bergy was later dismissed as moot. 444 U.S. 1028 (1980). The
Bergy patent claims were cancelled in a motion to vacate. 462 PAT. TRADEmARK &
COPYmGT J. (BNA) A-11 (1980); 461 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) A-8
to A-9 (1980).
80. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980) (5-4 decision; Brennan, J.,
White, J., Marshall, J., and Powell, J., dissenting). Regrettably, the Court did not
have the opportunity to consider if Chakrabarty's claim was distinguishable from
Bergy's claim to a biologically pure culture of an organism existing in nature, and
it chose to decide the issue narrowly. The Court said: "Specifically, we must determine whether respondent's micro-organism constitutes a 'manufacture' or 'composition of matter' within the meaning of [§ 101]." (emphasis added). Id. at 2207.
81. Id. at 2207.
82. Id. at 2208.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2209. The Court determined that the 1930 Act had been passed to
overcome two obstacles to the patentability of plants. "The first was the belief
that plants, even those artificially bred, were products of nature for purposes of
the patent law." The Act recognized the distinction for purposes of patentability
should be between products of nature and human-made inventions, not between
living and inanimate things. Since Chakrabarty's bacterium was clearly not a
product of "nature," the Court correctly determined that it was not unpatentable
on that ground. Id. at 2210.
The second barrier overcome by the 1930 Act was the specificity necessitated by
the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976). See note 17 and accompanying text supra. The Court noted that Congress relaxed the specificity required of Plant Patent claims but failed to explain why Chakrabarty's
microorganism was not limited by the § 112 requirements. 100 S. Ct. at 2209. See
Hearingson H.R. 11372 Before the House Committee on Patents, 71 Cong., 2d Sess.,
§ 4, 7 (1930) (memorandum of Patent Commissioner Robertson). See notes 110-11
and accompanying text infra.
85. The PTO had suggested that, due to the ambiguity of the patent statutes,

[VOL. 18: 263, 1981]

Comments
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

statutes 86 and decided that microorganisms are statutory subject
matter. When challenged by its own language in Flook, that the
courts must proceed cautiously when asked to extend patent
rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress,87 the Court
restricted Flook to claims involving "ideas" or "phenomena of na88
ture."
In an attempt to buttress its argument, the Patent Office
pointed out the serious hazards inherent in genetic research. The
PTO asked the Court to weigh the hazards to the public when
considering patentability of microorganisms under section 101.89
microorganisms were not patentable until Congress expressly authorized such
protection. Although the Supreme Court considered the ambiguity of § 101, it
failed to consider the ambiguity of the Plant Patent Acts as they relate to § 101. In
its discussion of the 1970 Act, the Court said that the legislative history gave no
guidance as to its applicability to microorganisms: "[I]t may simply reflect congressional agreement with the result ... [in] In re Arzberger... [o]r it may reflect the fact that prior to 1970 the Patent Office had issued patents for bacteria
under § 101." 100 S.Ct. at 2210. (In In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940),
the C.C.P.A. had determined that the congressional intent underlying the Plant
Patent laws was not to include bacteria as patentable subject matter.) Despite
this ambiguity the Court refused to await congressional guidance. See, e.g., Guttag, supra note 24, at 263, 270; Note, The Patentabilityof Living Organisns Under
35 U.S.C. § 101: Parker v. Bergy (Parker v. Chakrabarty), 15 NEW ENG. L REV. 379,
401 (1980); Note, supra note 7, at 193.
Judge Miller in Bergy pointed out that, under Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584
(1978), the courts must defer interpretation of patent law in favor of Congress if a
basis for substantial doubt exists as to congressional intent regarding the statutory language. He contended the Plant Patent Act provided a substantial basis of
doubt as to microorganism patents, and he called on Congress to act to define the
law in this area. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 999 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (Miller, J., dissenting).
A second source of ambiguity is what relation, if any, may exist between the
NIH Guidelines on genetic research authorized by Congress, and the lack of any
congressional intent to encourage private genetic research by allowing patent
grants on microorganisms. U.S. Dep't of HEW, National Institutes of Health, Recombinant DNA Research, Guidelines, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976); U.S. Dep't of
HEW, National Institutes of Health, Recombinant DNA Research, Revised Guidelines, 43 Fed. Reg. 60,080 (1978) [hereinafter cited as NIH Guidelines].
86. The Court pointed out that broad language is not necessarily ambiguous,
and the patent statute cannot be restricted to specific applications foreseen by the
legislators as the broad language was adopted principally because patentable inventions are frequently unforeseeable. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S.Ct. at 2211.
87. See note 65 supra.
88. 100 S.Ct. at 2211.
89. Id. See notes 154-60 and accompanying text infra. The Court could have
avoided this issue, at least in Chakrabarty's case, by acknowledging that the
Pseudomonas aeruginosabacterium used by Chakrabarty had been expressly excluded from the NIH Guidelines as non-hazardous. See NIH Guidelines, supra
note 85, at 60,130.

The Supreme Court recognized the potential hazards but refused
to consider them. The Court argued that denying patents for microorganisms is not likely to end genetic research and its risks because a great deal of research has already occurred without
assurances of patentablity.9 0 At best, said the Court, the research efforts will only be slowed or accelerated by the incentives
of patentability. 9 1 Thus limited, the Court had no alternative but
to authorize Chakrabarty's patent.
In light of the risks inherent in genetic research and the Court's
admitted institutional incompetence to determine the desirability
of encouraging such research, the Court's decision to extend patent protection to products of genetic research was not compelled
by statute or case law.92 The Court had several methods available
to exclude the products of genetic engineering from patentability.
Statutory Ambiguity
The courts have two optional approaches to the determination
of patentability. The first is to interpret the patent statutes freely,
in view of their broad general language, unless there is an explicit
limitation on patentability.9 3 The second is to determine whether
the subject matter sought to be patented is clearly within the statutory intent. If it is not, the statute should be construed narrowly
94
so as to exclude the claim.
When the Supreme Court summarily remanded Bergy for reconsideration in light of Flook, many thought the Court was
adopting this cautious second approach. 95 The C.C.P.A.'s decision
in In re Arzberger9 6 would have supported the non-patentability
90. 100 S. Ct. at 2211-12.
91. Id. at 2212.
92. Id. at 2211-12. This Comment will treat the Court's decision as promulgating a broad rule of patentability of genetically engineered microorganisms despite
the Court's having ostensibly limited the holding to the facts of the case.
93. See, e.g., Note, supra note 7, at 199. The author suggests that the courts'
only duty in determining patentability is to decide whether the patent law excludes the subject matter. If ambiguities in the statutes confuse this determination, the courts should extend the patent and let Congress correct any errors or
ambiguities.
94. Arguably, this is the position that was taken by the Supreme Court in
Flook when it said that the courts "must proceed cautiously when ... asked to
extend patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress." Parker v. Fook,
437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978). 'This policy rests on the principle that-the courts should
not expand patent protection by overruling or modifying prior cases construing
the Patent Act without a clear and certain signal from Congress." Note, supra
note 7, at 185. See Note, Patentingthe Microorganism: In re Bergy, The First Step
up the Chain of Life, 2 GEo. MASON U. L. REV. 265, 278 (1978).
95. See notes 65-67 and accompanying text supra.
96. 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.PA. 1940). See note 85 supra.
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of microorganisms. 97 The PTO's patent grants to inventions involving microorganisms would not prevent the Court from so
holding.98 Nevertheless, the Court adopted the first approach in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,and refused to consider the "policy" issues despite the long history of judicial policy decisions on patentability in the form of judicially created limitations on
patentability. 99
The Court should have determined whether the subject matter
sought to be patented, genetically engineered microorganisms,
was clearly within the legislative intent of the patent statutes. Although the majority of the Court said the statutes were clear,100
four of the nine justices disagreedloi Many commentators and
members of the judiciary have argued that the statutes are ambiguous and the legislative intent unclear about the patentability of
microorganisms.102 These critics have called for congressional
clarification. 03
Other Groundsfor Rejecting the MicroorganismClaim
Even accepting the Court's conclusion that neither the patent
statute nor the legislative intent is ambiguous, 04 the Court was
not without other means to reject the microorganism claims as
unpatentable. Although the product of nature doctrine was not
available, because Chakrabarty's organism was man-made, 0 5 the
phenomenon of nature doctrine can be applied to the claim.
Judge Baldwin, concurring in Bergy, 0 6 described the phenomenon in Chakrabarty as any biological metabolism of hydrocar97. Id.
98. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct at 2210 n.9; Daus, Bond & Rose, MicrobiologicalPlant Patents, 10 IDEA 87, 94 n.36 (1966) (citing several examples of
patents issued for claims involving living microorganisms. Some of the claims are
distinguishable as processes or inocula; none involve genetic engineering nor were
any challenged in the courts on the issue presented in Chakrabarty). See notes 35
and 42 and accompanying text supra.
99. See notes 23-34 and accompanying text, supra, showing that courts have
denied patents to claims even in the absence of statutory authority or legislative
intent so indicating..
100. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 2211 (1980).
101. Id. at 2213 (Brennan, J., White, J., Marshall, J., and Powell, J., dissenting).
102. See note 44 supra.
103. See note 79 supra.
104. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. at 2212.
105. Id. at 2208.
106. See note 85 and accompanying text supra. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 997
(C.C.P.A. 1979) (Baldwin, J., concurring).

bons.107 Had the phenomenon been phrased as the ability of
strains of the genus Pseudomonas to metabolize hydrocarbons,
the doctrine could have been invoked, because the patent claim
included naturally occurring strains of that genus.108
The Court might have seized the Plant Patent Act argument
adopted by the Chakrabarty minority'0 9 to exclude microorganisms from patentability.
The Court might also have rejected the application on the
ground that it failed to meet the description requirements of section 112.110 Although Bergy's Streptomyces vellosus could have
met the current requirement of a taxonomic description accompanying the deposit of a culture sample, it is doubtful that a more
complex, recombined organism like Chakrabarty's Pseudomonas
could do so.1" The Court could also have characterized the grant107. 100 S. Ct. at 2208. There is evidence Bergy's claim was withdrawn in anticipation that the Supreme Court might seize the phenomenon of nature doctrine to
exclude it from patentability. Cooper, Arzberger Under the Microscope: A Critical
Reexamination of the Exclusion of Bacteria from Plant Patent Protection, 7
Ru.GERs J. CogM., TECH. & LAW 367, 379 n.9 (1980) (editor's postscript).
108. Judge Baldwin noted that Chakrabarty's claim would not preempt the biological metabolism of hydrocarbons. Nevertheless, Chakrabarty's Claims 21 and 30
claimed an inoculum and an inoculated medium containing bacterium of the
genus Pseudomonas "at least some of which" are the genetically engineered organisms produced by Chakrabarty. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 996-97. Because a
number of naturally occurring strains of the genus Pseudomonas can also degrade
hydrocarbons and are claimed in the patent application, the patent claims a phenomenon of nature at least as to those organisms. See Note, supra note 7, at 195.
109. 100 S. Ct. at 2213.
110. See notes 17, 84, and accompanying text supra.
111. Although the PTO has no legislative mandate to require that a patent application for a microorganism be accompanied by a representative culture, the
present regulations issued by the Patent Commission require that the subject microorganism be deposited in the Northern Regional Research Laboratories, along
with a taxonomic description of the organism. Behr, The Prescient Microbe or
Where to Deposit a Foreign Body, 57 J. PAT. OFT. Soc'Y 28 (1975). See In re
Argoudelis, 434 F.2d 1390 (C.C.PA. 1970). It is doubtful that complex genetically
recombined organisms, or multi-cellular cultures, can meet the taxonomic description requirement. In determining the patentability of a microorganism, the Patent
Examiner must deal solely with the written description. Even with the deposit it
is extremely difficult to tell if strains of the same species are the same or different.
Note, The Patentability of Living Organisms Under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Parker v.
Bergy (Parker v. Chakrabarty), 15 NEW ENG. I REV. 379, 403 (1980); Robbins, Patents for Microbiological Transforrnations-AnInternationalProblem, 42 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'ly 830, 833-34, 838 (1960).

It has been argued that the present deposit and taxonomic description standard
does not adequately describe the patented subject matter so as to give the public
the information the patent system is supposed to provide, Guttag, supra note 24,
at 277, or to give adequate warning to infringers that they are violating the law.
Note, Patentability of Micro-Organisms: Legal Control of Life, 47 U. Mo. KAN.
Crry L. Rav. 130, 142 (1978). The present "deposit" system may also lead to
problems of storage. The microorganisms now on deposit are commonly occurring
and easy to maintain. Nevertheless, as research advances and more complex
recombined or symbiotic multi-organism cultures become increasingly common,
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ing of patents for microorganisms as an expansion of patent
rights into an area unforeseen by Congress. The Court could
have refused to uphold the patent based on the language in
Flook112 rather than limiting the holding to algorithms and phenomena of nature." 3
Preemption of Improvements
As previously noted, the Flook decision relied on O'Reilly v.
Morse to deny a patent claim for a mathematical algorithm."4
The underlying rationale in Morse was not that the claim contained a "scientific principle," as the Bergy and Flook Courts professed, but that the claimed application of the principle was too
broad. The Morse Court denied the patent claim because to have
allowed it would have prohibited or impeded development in a
useful art.
When Morse submitted his patent application for the telegraph,
many scientists throughout the world were conducting experiments in the new and relatively unexplored field of electromagnetism.n15 In his patent claim, Morse sought the exclusive right to
every invention in which the motive power was electric current
and the result was the marking of intelligible characters at a distance.1 6 The Supreme Court pointed out that if such a claim
were allowed, a future inventor would be precluded from obtaining a patent even though his invention might be less complicated, less expensive in operation and construction, and more
reliable. The Morse Court apparently feared that too broad a
claim would discourage later research and improvements benefithe maintenance of these fastidious cultures may become more difficult and expensive. Note, Ownership of Living Inventions-In re Bergy, 29 DE PAUL L.REV.
215, 234-35 (1979). (The author also notes that higher forms of life may be unpatentable because of their inability to meet the requirement that the description be
sufficient to allow one skilled in the art to make and use the invention. Id. at 235.)
See also In re Bergy, 596 F.2d at 997 n.7 (Baldwin, J., concurring) (noting the "inherent difficulty in complying with the enablement provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 112" as
to more complex life forms).
112. See note 65 supra.
113. 100 S. Ct. at 2211.
114. See notes 73-75 and accompanying text supra.
115. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 106 (1853).
116. In Claim 8 Morse stated: "I do not propose to limit myself to the specific
machinery or parts of machinery described in the foregoing specification and

claims; the essence of my invention being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current .... " Id. at 112.

cial to the public.117 Thus, based on constitutional and legislative
intent, the Court held that a patent confers on the inventor "the
exclusive right to use the means specified to produce the result
he describes, and nothing more."118
The Court has granted patents, despite the inclusion of a scientific principle or mathematical algorithm when the claimed uses
of a principle in a process are sufficiently limited."19 The Flook
Court cited Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of
America120 for the proposition that Morse requires the process incorporating the algorithm be "new and useful."121 Mackay, however, was not decided on the basis of novelty or usefulness of the
invention.122 The Mackay Court based its decision on the fact
that the application of the principle in the patent claim was a narrow one, and the claim was strictly construed. 123 The fact the
claimed invention may be new and useful has no bearing on
whether it is stated too broadly.
The C.C.P.A., in dismissing Flook as inapplicable to Bergy and
Chakrabarty, considered only one aspect of the rationale for the
rejection of the patent claims in Flook. The court recognized that
the Flook claims involved an unpatentable "principle," but failed
to consider the claims might be so overbroad and unspecific as to
preempt future improvements. 24
117. The Court was concerned that Morse, the earlier patent grantee, would be
able to incorporate all of the new discoveries and developments without having to
record a description with the patent office, thus depriving the public of the details.
Id. at 113.
118. Id. at 119.
119. See Mackay Radio &TeL Co. v. Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. 86 (1939);
Eibel Process Co. v. Minn. & Ont. Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1880).
120. 306 U.S. 86 (1939).
121. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 591 (1978) (citing Mackay Radio & TeL Co. v.
Radio Corp. of America, 306 U.S. at 94). See also Note, Life Forms as Proper Subject Matter Under the Patent Act: Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 1980 DET. ComI L
REV. 939, 951-53 (1980).
122. The Mackay Court stated: "We assume, without deciding the point, that
this advance was invention even though it was achieved by the logical application
of a known scientific law to a familiar type of antenna." 306 U.S. at 94.
123. The Court refused to accept the ruling of the court of appeals that Mackay's patent applied to antennas, using all lengths of wire and all angles, that embraced the patent's empirical formula. Where the later inventor specified exact
angles and lengths for wire, the prior patent grantee could not establish infringement. Id.
124. See notes 127-34 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of possible
preemption of improvements or discoveries in the field due to the Chakrabarty
patent grant. Judge Baldwin in his concurring opinion alludes to this preemption
problem but restricts the discussion to "natural phenomenon" and "scientific principles," joining the court on the ground that a bacterium is not a "principle" and
that Bergy and Chakrabarty did not seek to wholly preempt the use of the "phenomenon." In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 988, 990, 997 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (Baldwin, J., con-
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A patent on a process or manufacture employing a scientific
principle or mathematical algorithm may be denied for two reasons. Under the "phenomenon of nature" doctrine, the principle
or algorithm is not considered a discovery or invention, even
when the formula has no other practical application. 125 Alternatively, the court may find that the claim is overbroad and upholding the patent on the principle or algorithm would inhibit
improvements in design, manufacture, or operation through other
applications of the principle.
The Chakrabarty Court failed to fully consider the doctrine of
preemption. Judge Baldwin in Bergy recognized that other
strains of bacteria are capable of degrading hydrocarbons and he
concluded that Chakrabarty's patent would not altogether preempt biological metabolism of hydrocarbons.12 6 He failed to note,
however, that the patented organism might have other uses.
Given the infant state of the genetic engineering field and the
lack of information on the functioning of the genetic coding process, it is unlikely that a researcher who develops a new strain of
an organism will have sufficient prescience to anticipate all possible uses of his organism. An organism capable of producing one
therapeutic drug might serendipitously be discovered to produce
yet another drug in a different process.

27

It is rare for the origi-

nally developed organism to be the most useful commercially.
Later researchers often make substantial improvements.1 28 The
original use may be trivial when compared to later derivations
and improvements. 129 Should the Court inhibit such later discoveries by granting a patent covering every process and use employing the microorganism? This would require researchers to obtain
licenses in order to use the new organism.130 Such a policy would
curring). See Note, Ownership of Living Inventions-In re Bergy, 29 DE PAUL L.
REV. 215, 226 (1979). One commentator has seized on Judge Baldwin's concurrence to criticize the decision in Bergy. See Note, supra note 7, at 193-94.
125. See, e.g., In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 161 (C.C.P.A. 1976); notes 29-30 and

accompanying text supra. This was the position taken in Flook. See notes 69-75
and accompanying text supra.
126. See note 108 and accompanying text supra.
127. Kitch, supra note 6 at 269; Note, Patentingthe Microorganism: In re Bergy,
The FirstStep up the Chain of Life, 2 GEo.MASON U.I REV. 265, 268 (1978).
128. Robbins, Patents for Microbiological Transformations-An International
Problem, 42 J. PAT. OFF.Soc'y 830 (1960).
129. Id. at 840.

130. The patent grants the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling

the patented subject matter. The patentee may give or deny licenses to use the

discourage research by others and slow or deter improvements in
the manufacture and application of the organism.131 This is directly contrary to the mandate of the Constitution 32 and to the
34
holdings in Morse 133 and Mackay.
An inventor of a novel organism can be adequately protected
without receiving a patent on the microorganism itself.135 The
PTO has traditionally allowed patents on processes or inocula
utilizing microorganisms. 36 Allowing a patent on a process or

specific use of the organism would protect the inventor's discov3 7
ery while allowing the microorganism to be used by the public.
This policy would enhance the probability of later improvements
in the patented process employing the organism, or in other dis-

tinct processes using it, by encouraging research by scientists
who presumably could patent their discoveries if they met the
novelty and nonobviousness requirements of sections 102 and 103.
In Chakrabarty's case, the patent could have been limited to
use of the microorganism to clean up oil spills. If further uses are

discovered later, they too might be patentable. Currently, General Electric, as assignee of Chakrabarty's patent, 3 8 could decide
subject matter for reasons wholly within his discretion, and he need not license
anyone at all. 8 A. DELLER, DELLER'S WALKER ON PATENTS 214, 225 (2d ed. 1964). A
solution to this may be compulsory licensing of microorganism patents. See Kitch,
supra note 6, at 286-87.
131. But see Note, The PatentabilityofLiving Organisms Under 35 U.S.C. § 101:
Parker v. Bergy (Parker v. Chakrabarty), 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 379, 404 (1980) (author generally supports patentability of microorganisms).
132. See note 1 and accompanying text supra.
133. See notes 117-18 and accompanying text supra.
134. See note 123 and accompanying text supra.
135. Cf. Note, Patentabilityof Micro-Organisms: Legal Control of Life, 47 U.
Mo. KAN. Crry L REV. 130, 139-40 (1978) (author suggests even patents on the microorganisms themselves would provide inadequate protection).
136. Note, Patenting the Microorganism: In re Bergy, The First Step up the
Chain of Life, 2 GEo. MASON U.L REv. 265, 270 (1978). See, e.g., Guaranty Trust
Co. of New York v. Union Solvents Corp., 54 F.2d 400 (D. Del. 1931), affid per
curiam, 61 F.2d 1041 (3d Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 614 (1933) (microorganism
used in process accelerating fermentation of butyl alcohol and acetone); Cameron
Septic Tank Co. v. Village of Saratoga Springs, 159 F. 453 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 209
U.S. 548 (1908) (bacteria used in a sewage treatment process).
137. But see Note, The Patentabilityof Living Organisms Under35 U.S.C. § 101:
In re Bergy, 58 NEB. L. REv. 303, 328-29 (1978), which suggests that such a policy
avoids the virtually impossible task of trying to duplicate the microorganism by
requiring the microoganism to be placed on deposits the public may gain access to
it, while the microorganism itself should be patentable so the developer will benefit from every use of the strain, even those that he did not contemplate. There are
two problems with this view. First, it assumes the purpose of the patent system is
to reward inventors rather than to promote the useful arts. See note 7 and accompanying text supra. Second, it fails to explain how the grant of a monopoly on a
strain of bacterium will encourage others to conduct research for other possible
uses of that strain.
138. See note 48 supra.
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not to license other researchers and could forestall improvements
or further uses of the bacteria. The Court should have rejected
the Chakrabarty claim as overbroad or lacking in specificity.
The Supreme Court and Public Policy
Most importantly, the Supreme Court is not entirely incapable
of acting on the policy considerations underlying the patentability
of microorganisms developed by genetic engineering. 3 9 In granting the patent on a product of genetic research the Court must
have determined the hazards of such research were not substantial enough to warrant immediate protective action. 40 This in itself was an "act" based on the constitutional policy of
encouraging research in the useful arts as expressed through legislative intent.' 4 '
The Court might as easily have based its decision on the constitutional policy of excluding from patentability subject matter.that
threatens injury to the well-being, good policy or morals of the society, 42 and then refused to act without congressional guidance.
Determinations of patentability have often been highly subjective,
inconsistent with statutory intent, 43 arbitrary, unexplained, 44
based on judicially created limitations 45 or on judicial fiat.146
Thus it is not unreasonable for the Court to refuse patent incentives for research that may be injurious to the public weal.
The Supreme Court has made a decision encouraging private
party participation in recombinant DNA research. 47 It is true
that if Congress decides the statutes are being improperly applied
it may change or clarify them. 48 Until that time it is preferable
that the courts adopt a narrow interpretation of the patent statutes in this area. In view of the uncertain legislative intent and
the potential hazards of genetic research it seems imprudent to
139. But see Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 2212 (1980), where the
Court indicated it was unable to consider the policy arguments, either to brush
aside the hazards of genetic research as groundless fears or to act on them.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 2206-07.
142. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
143. Guttag, supra note 24, at 276-77.
144. See notes 31-34 supra.
145. See text accompanying notes 18-30 supra.

146. See note 37 and accompanying text supra.
147. See T=uz, March 9, 1981, at 52.
148. 100 S. Ct. 2204, 2211 (1980).

give patent incentives to such research by broadly construing the
patent statutes. 49 Regardless of the ultimate desirability of extending patent protection to products of genetic research, it would
be wiser to provide Congress and the public with the opportunity
to debate the issue and to create a system that regulates private
research in recombinant genetics.
THE

PROPRIETY OF PATENTING PRODUCTS OF GENETIC RESEARCH

Man's ability to alter his environment has developed far more rapidly than
his ability to foresee with certainty the effects of his alterations. It is only
recently that we have begun to appreciate the danger posed by unregulated modification of the world around us, and have created watchdog
agencies whose task it is to warn us, and protect us, when technological
"advances" present dangers unappreciated-or unrevealed-by their supporters. Such agencies unequipped with crystal balls and unable to read
the future, are nonetheless charged with evaluating the effects of unprecedented environmental modifications, often made on a massive scale. Necessarily, they must deal with predictions and uncertainty, with developing
evidence, with conflicting evidence, and, sometimes, with little or no evidence at all.150

Environmental Risks
Critics of genetic research warn, that by creating new organisms, scientists are opening a pandora's box of evils which they
are ill equipped to control. The doomsayers counsel it is often
better "to bear those ills we have than to fly to others that we
know not of."'15 Recent developments in other technical fields
may prove them right. Scientists themselves have recognized
that many new products or technologies often have unexpected
environmental effects.' 5 2 Pesticides and chemical waste have

proven to be toxic to wildlife and man, gases used in spray cans
and many common substances
deplete the earth's ozone layer,
are now known to cause cancer.1 53
Nightmarish scenarios involving manmade organisms have
been suggested. For example, an insulin producing bacterium
might find its way into the human body, producing insulin
149. Id. at 2207, 2211.
150. Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1, 26 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (cited in G. Halbert, Developing a Governmental Policyfor the Regulation of
Environmental Mutagens and Teratogens: Shopping at the Grand Bazaar, in GENEUTCS AND THE LAw I1, 426-27 (A. Milunsky ed. 1980)).
151. 100 S. Ct. at 2211.
152. B. Davis, Three Specters: DangerousProducts,Powers or Ideas, in GENETIcs AND THE LAw II 3 (A. Milunsky ed. 1980).
153. Recombinant DNA Research Act of 1977 Hearings on H.K 4759, 4889, 3191,
3591, 3592, 5020, 4232 and H. Res.131 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House Comm on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 303 (1977) (statement of Pamela Lippe).
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shock.154 An oil-eating bacterium might escape from oil spills to
devour oil in machinery.l5 5 While these flights of fancy may
merely be amusing conjecture, more substantial threats have occurred. Dr. Chakrabarty himself transferred a gene that produces
cellulase 5 6 into E. coli bacteria. 5 7 Dr. Chakrabarty destroyed the
bug when warned that, should it be transmitted into the general
population, countless people might be inflicted with chronic or fatal diarrhea. 5 8 In 1971 Dr. Berg of Stanford University implanted
a cancer causing virus into E. coli bacteria. He too destroyed the
bacteria when other scientists alerted him to the danger to society should it escape. 5 9 In 1980 Dr. Ian Kennedy of the University
of California, San Diego, apparently unwittingly conducted experiments with a strain of Simliki forest virus, which had been
banned from use in research by National Institutes of Health
Guidelines, thinking it was a harmless strain of sindibus virus.
Purely by good fortune the experiments were conducted in a se60
cure laboratory and the organisms were later safely destroyed.
The potential harm to the public in these cases was luckily
averted, statistically, as research in this area increases, we may
not continue to be so fortunate.
Recombinant DNA research has significant potential value to
society and its substantial benefits should be noted. Apart from
generally advancing human understanding of biological functions,
microbiological research has developed organisms that can produce the fuel additive ethanol, penicillin, somastatin (used in
treatment of hormonal disorders), thymosin alpha-1 (used to treat
certain brain and lung cancers), insulin (used to control diabetes), and interferon (a potential cancer cure).161 Genetic research
154. U.S. Dep't of HEW, National Institutes of Health, Decision of the Director,
National Institutes of Health to Release Guidelines for Research on Recombinant
DNA Molecules, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,908 (1976).
155. Wald, The Case Against Genetic Engineering, THE SCIENCES, Sept./Oct
1976, at 10.
156. An enzyme which breaks down the structural plant protein cellulose. Cellulose is indigestible by man and therefore gives bulk to feces.
157. Escherichia coli is the most common host organism used in recombinant
DNA research. It inhabits the soil, water, and the intestines of all warm-blooded
animals, including man.
158. Note, Ownership of Living Inventions-In re Bergy, 29 DEPAUL L. REV. 215,
233, n.119 (1979).
159. Bennett & Gurin, Science that Frightens Scientists, THE ATLANTIC
MoNTHLY, Feb. 1977, at 43.
160. Los Angeles Times, Aug. 7, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
161. TlnE, Oct. 20, 1980, at 72.

has great promise of increasing the over-all health and well-being
of society. Some scientists have suggested that the fears of the
critics might be overblown.162 Thus it appears genetic engineering may be a Janus of sorts, presenting both spectacular potential
for benefits to the public and foreboding possibilities of irreparable harm to public health and safety.
PhilosophicalConsiderations
Recombinant DNA research also poses unique philosophical
and moral questions. "The power to design life according to
man's intellect is repugnant to many people; it assumes omniscience too close to God for many to accept. Recombinant research may present man with another forbidden fruit decisionwhether to place the course of all evolution into our own
63
hands."1
It is the province of Congress to decide these essentially moral
issues, to balance the needs of society with threats to public
health, morals and well-being.164 Yet the Supreme Court, by allowing patentability of products of genetic research, has made
these decisions while reciting its institutional incompetence to do
so. 165 The Court has noted "the grant or denial of patents on microorganisms is not likely to put an end to genetic research or to
its attendant risks" since substantial research has already occurred in the absence of patent protection for researchers. 66 The
Court dismissed as inconsequential the fact that the determination of patentability may either accelerate or slow genetic research through manipulation of the patent incentives which
encourage private participation in genetic research.167 It is precisely this uncontrolled, privately funded genetic research which
calls for caution.
Unregulated Genetic Research
Until recently, much of the research in this field has been federally funded. The Supreme Court's Diamond v. Chakrabartydecision preceded an increase in awareness by private industry of the
potential of genetic research. Several small genetic engineering
162. Note, The Patentabilityof Living Organisms Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: Parker
v. Bergy (Parker v. Chakrabarty), 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 379, 403 (1980).
163. Berger, Government Regulationof the PursuitofKnowledge: The Recombinant DNA Controversy, 3 VT. L. REv. 83, 89 (1978).
164. Id. at 98-99.
165. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 2212 (1980).
166. Id. at 2211-12.
167. Id. at 2212.
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firms have appeared over the past four years,1 68 and now giant
multi-national corporations with capital sufficient to fund major
research projects are about to enter the field.169 While it may be
true that recombinant DNA technology is not likely to achieve its
full promise absent private financial and intellectual support 7 0 it
is not clear that private industry participation in such a potentially dangerous field should be encouraged until adequate guidelines are formulated to regulate private genetic research.
Congress has not enacted legislation to govern either private or
17
publicly funded recombinant DNA research. '
The Supreme Court's decision to afford patent protection to
products of recombinant DNA research will provide a major incentive to the private development of new microorganisms.72
Private enterprises are motivated by profit. If competition exists,
profit provides incentive for efficient resource allocation through
increased output. But sole control of any scarce and unique resource makes for less output and higher prices for that resource.
Patents create sole control of the patented resource. Where monopolistic control exists, the profit motive leads to trade restriction. A central goal of patent law is the resolution of this
efficiency/trade restriction dilemma.1 7 3 It has been contended
patent protection is not essential for continuing the research of
large corporations.17 4 While this may be true, the patentability of
products of genetic research clearly will not discourage private
corporate involvement in the field and does act to enhance profitability of such research.
The interface of the patentability of microorganisms, the encouragement of private genetic engineering, and the lack of effective guidelines to regulate recombinant DNA research is
168. Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1980, at 47, col. 3.
169. TmE, Oct. 20, 1980, at 72. Previously at least one of the small firms was
sharing laboratory space and employees with federally funded research institutions governed by NIH Guidelines. Now these firms will be able to fund independent research.
170. Cripps, Genetic Engineering-A Problemfor the Patent Office?, 1979 NEW
ZEALAND LI. 232.
171. Note, The PatentabilityOf Living Organisms Under35 U.S.C. § 101: Parker
v. Bergy (Parker v. Chakrabarty), 15 NEW ENG. L REV. 379, 405 n.193 (1980).
172. Note, The Patentabilityof Living Organisms Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: In re
Bergy, 91 HARV. I REV. 1357, 1365 (1978).
173. W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTRusT LAw 4 (1973).
174. See F. VAUGHAN, THE UNITED STATES PATENT SYSTEM 12 (1956).

complicated. Patents are awarded to the "first inventor,"175 a
technical status nearly always accorded the first person to file the
patent application. 176 When technology brings an invention into
the realm of possibility, the creative efforts of many scientists will
likely be similarly directed. 77 Because the researchers are aware
of each other, and because the invention need not be commercially valuable in its initial version to be patentable, the patent
system results in greater secrecy in the initial stages of development and in many hastily prepared applications which are rushed
to the Patent Office to establish priority.178 It is not unreasonable
to suppose that proper laboratory techniques and safety guidelines, voluntarily self-imposed, might be lost amid the frenetic
confusion of the great race to file.
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) has promulgated genetic research guidelines under its informal rule-making authority.179 The NIH Guidelines, however, apply only to research
conducted at, or sponsored by an institution receiving NIH support for that research.180 Even the safety of research conducted
at NIH-sponsored institutions has been subjected to criticism.181
The NIH Guidelines depend for their effectiveness on the use of
proper laboratory techniques, which may be lacking even in university research,182 and the only mechanism for enforcement consists of denial of grants by the NIH.183 The NIH's role as both
benefactor and policeman makes enforcement of the Guidelines
84
more difficult stll1'
Private industry has suggested it would voluntarily follow the
NIH Guidelines.185 It is not required to do so, however, and there
175. See note 15 supra.
176. Kitch, supra note 6, at 269.
177. Id.
178. Roberts, First to Invent-A FadingConcept?, 61 J. PAT. OFF.Soc'y 350, 351
(1979).
179. Hutt, Research on Recombinant DNA Molecules: The Regulatory Issues, 51
S. CAL. L. REV.1435-1445 (1978).
180. NIH Guidelines, supra note 85, at 60,123.
181. Berger, supra note 163.
182. Id. at 91 n.26. The incident involving Dr. Kennedy, for example, occurred
at a NIH sponsored laboratory. See note 160 supra.
183. Hutt, supra note 179, at 1444.
184. The Atomic Energy Commission formerly had such a dual role, but Congress considered it improper and divided the duties between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Energy Research and Development Administrition.
Berger, supra note 163, at 92.
185. Hutt, supra note 179, at 1441-42. In order to induce private industry compliance with NIH Guidelines, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Science and
Technology requested that the PTO give special status to patent applications involving recombinant DNA when the applicant voluntarily followed the Guidelines.
That status has been revoked pending further consideration. See Patent and
Trademark Off, Recombinant DNA, Accelerated Processing of Patent Applications
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are no indications that it would. In light of the lack of effective
guidelines and the effect the Chakrabarty decision will have in
encouraging private genetic research, Congress must act quickly
to provide adequate protection to the public.
Congress Facedwith a Dilemma
It is now up to Congress to weigh the merits of genetic research
against the moral questions, health risks, environmental dangers,
and systematic difficulties in affording patent incentives to private
genetic research. 86 While it may be true that encouraging genetic research is in the public interest, in reaching that decision,
Congress is capable of making the in-depth investigation for
which the courts are ill-equipped. 87 Congress is faced with serious issues. Morally and ethically, ought society seek and use the
means to control the genetic structures of living organisms, and
potentially those of man? In view of the danger currently posed
by unregulated, private genetic research, does the federal government wish to encourage such research by giving patent incentives; and if so, what can be done to mitigate the danger?
In balancing the potential benefits of recombinant DNA research with the potential hazards, the scientists have stressed the
benefits. They denigrate the critics' warnings as being "a gruesome parade of horribles" with no basis in reality.

88

Supporters

of genetic research refute the philosophical issues by arguing that
it would be unethical to forego the benefits. 89 The scientists' position is based partly on reason, familiarity with the facts, and logical extrapolation, and partly on their faith in themselves to
control their activities. 9 0 What they fail to realize is that the determination to regulate genetic research may have less to do with
for Inventions, 42 Fed. Reg. 2,712 (1977), suspended in part,Patent and Trademark
Off., Recombinant DNA, Suspension of Accelerated Processing of Patent Applications for Recombinant DNA Research Inventions, 42 Fed. Reg. 13,147 (1977).
186. Note, The PatentabilityOf Living Organisms Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: In re
Bergy, 91 ARAv. L. REV. 1357, 1365 (1978); Note, The Patentabilityof Living Organims Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: Parker v. Bergy (Parker v. Chakrabarty), 15 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 379, 405 (1980).
187. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 2212 (1980).
188. Id. at 2211. Patent Decision Fuels Genetic Research Debate, 66 A.B.A. J.
943, 944 (1980).
189. Patent Decision Fuels Genetic Research Debate, 66 A.B.A. J. 943, 944

(1980).
190. Fletcher, Ethics and Recombinant DNA Research, 51 S. Ca_ L. REV. 1131,
1134 (1978).

whether the dangers are actual or imagined than it has to do with
how genetic research is perceived by the populace.
The public does not share the scientists' faith in themselves.
Critics contend that holders of patents on genetic research would
be able to play God; that patents for genetic engineering techniques create the potential for industrial control of the earth's
gene pool; and that "ownership of life" may result in the upheaval
of legal, social, and moral systems.' 91
The public has a legitimate democratic right to be informed of
the nature of DNA research and its hazards in order to weigh the
costs and benefits. The public should make the moral choice
whether genetic research should be encouraged by government
patent protection.192 In the long term, with increased familiarity,
the public will come to appreciate the nature of genetic research
and will be better able to deal with these issues rationally. 93 Paradoxically, it appears that the freedom of the scientists to conduct
research in areas such as genetic engineering, which may pose
special dangers to society, is not likely to have the support of the
public unless appropriate safeguards can be developed which
temporarily limit that freedom. 94
Patents for products of genetic research, upheld by the courts
in the absence of a legislative mandate, may foreclose all chance
for meaningful public education and participation in the policy
decisions surrounding genetic engineering. Simultaneously, the
drive for commercial application of such products will escalate
with apparent government support.195 Public debates, demonstrations, and referenda concerning such matters as the dumping of
chemical wastes and building of nuclear power plants indicate
that the public desires democratic control over the technological
decisions that may affect their lives.196
The moral and philosophical questions, as well as the hazards
and benefits, of genetic research are vital issues which should be
discussed in a legislative or public forum.197 It is for the people,
191. Patent Decision Fuels Genetic ResearchDebate, 66 A.B.A. J. 943, 944 (1980).
192. See generally Lapp& & Martin, The Place of the Public in the Conduct of
Science, 51 S. CA-. L REV. 1535, 1539 (1978).
193. Neville, PhilosophicPerspectives on Freedom of Inquiry, 51 S. CAL L REV.
1115, 1129 (1978). Dr. Chakrabarty has recognized that the resolution of this debate necessitates "informed people." Patent Decision Fuels Genetic Research Debate, 66 A.B.A. J. 943, 944 (1980).
194. Neville, supra note 193, at 1129. See also D. Callahan, Ethical Issues in the
Control of Science, in GENETICS AND THE LAw 1119-24 (A. Milunsky ed. 1980).
195. PatentDecision Fuels Genetic Research Debate, 66 A.B.A. J. 943, 944 (1980)
(citing an amicus brief in Diamond v. Chakrabarty).
196. Berger, supra note 163, at 93-94.
197. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 2211-12 (1980).
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through their elected representatives, or by referendum, to decide
if genetic research by private industry should be encouraged by
patent incentives, if such research should first be subject to regulation, or if patents should be denied.1 98
CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

While Congress has not yet passed legislation governing recombinant DNA research, hearings have been held99 and numerous
bills have been introduced 20O in both houses of Congress. 20 1 After
Diamond v. Chakrabarty,20 2 private industry's participation in
the genetic engineering field will be stimulated and inasmuch as
private research is not covered by NIH guidelines, immediate congressional action is called for, either to formulate regulations or to
remove certain patent incentives. 203
The main obstacles to the passage of genetic research legislation have been concern about violating rights of researchers, 204
and difficulties in drafting. 205 The reaction of the scientific com198. See id. at 2212.
199. See, e.g., Regulation of Recombinant DNA Researck" Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978); Genetic Engineering,
1975: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Health of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); Recombinant DNA Research Act of
1977 HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), cited in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. at 2212 n.11.
200. See, e.g., S. 2234, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (requires annual reports of recombinant DNA research by researchers; provides for public disclosure of research, except trade secret and commercial information for which disclosure is
required only in the event of an imminent hazard to the public or environment); S.
1217, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976) (amended 1977) (established presidential commission with authority to issue regulations and licenses for public and private recombinant DNA research and provided for severe penalties); S. 621, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1976) (provided HEW should enact guidelines regulating all genetic research; required strict liability for injuries resulting from such research.); M:R
11,192, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1976) (extended NIH guidelines to encompass all genetic research).
201. Berger, -upranote 163, at 92-93; Halvorson, DNA and the Law, 51 S. CAm I
REV. 1167, 1172-73 (1978).
202. 100 S. Ct. 2204 (1980).
203. See Friedman, Health HazardsAssociated with Recombinant DNA Technology: Should Congress Impose Liability without Fault?, 51 S. CAT_ L REV. 1355,
1379 (1978).
204. See, e.g., Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research. A Constitutional
Analysis, 51 S. CAT_ L REV. 1203, 1209 (1978).
205. See Berger, supra note 163, at 107.

munity to suggestions for regulations inhibiting scientific research has been one of fear that genetic research might be overly
restricted or even banned. 06 The researchers are aghast that
anyone would interfere with academic freedom and they assert a
20
theoretical constitutional right to conduct scientific inquiries.
Minimizing Risks Through Regulation
While it is in the best interests of both the public and the scientific community to design legislation governing genetic research
so as to minimize the impact on free scientific inquiry,2 08 this is
not to say that regulation is unwarranted. The environmental
hazards of recombinant DNA research are divisible into two categories. There is the "direct risk" of a "biohazard" involving the
release of a pathogenic organism into the environment where it
could infect plants and animals, causing disease or death, and
there is the long-term or "indirectrisk."' The latter is a more speculative hazard that a recombination of DNA molecules across species lines, especially in higher life forms, would result in violation
of natural barriers and cause an evolutionary disaster.209
In the regulation of genetic research, an even greater distinction may be drawn between these risks. We may differentiate between what has, until recently, been predominantly "pure
research" in recombinant DNA and research that is intended to
206. Id. at 101.
207. See generally Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Researck A Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L REV. 1203, 1209-18 (1978). Although this topic is be-

yond the scope of this Comment, in summary, the author bases the proposed
constitutional right to research on the right to liberty and privacy of the fourteenth amendment and the right of free speech and association of the first amendment. The author points out that the Supreme Court has never decided the issue.
Id. at 1211.
Galileo and Darwin have been cited as examples of targets of illogical public reactions to new discoveries which contradict strongly held societal beliefs. B. Davis, Three Specters: Dangerous Products,Powers or Ideas, in GENEncs AND THE
LAw 1 7 (A. Milunsky ed. 1980). The comparison of the criticism of unrestrained
genetic research to the attack on Galileo and Darwin is of little value. While
Galileo merely observed the heavens and Darwin contemplated unchangeable
evolutionary patterns, the modern genetic engineers seek to make changes in nature. Thus the freedom of inquiry which they are seeking is not merely the freedom to observe and record, or freedom with words; it is the freedom to modify
organisms that may have environmental effects deleterious to us all. Cohen, Restrictionof Research with RecombinantDNA: The Dangersof Inquiry and the Burden of Proof, 51 S. CA. L. REv. 1081, 1104 (1978). "Galileo is protected, Dr.
Frankenstein is not." J. Robertson, The Scientist'sRight to Research and the Legitimacy of Governmental Regulation, in GENETiCS AND THE LAw 1136 (A. Milunsky
ed. 1980).
208. Berger, supra note 163, at 107.
209. See Fletcher, Ethics and Recombinant DNA Research, 51 S. CArL. L REV.
1131, 1135-36 (1978); Grobstein, Regulationand Basic Research: Implications of Recombinant DNA, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1188-89 (1978).
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produce a marketable organism or by-product. 21o In the first instance, the value to the public of the "non-use-oriented" research
is indirect and nonquantifiable. It consists of contributions to scientific knowledge and a greater understanding of the mechanics
of biochemistry. 21 ' Similarly, the risks to society in "non-use-oriented" research are indirect, and society may only be inadver2 2
tently affected. '
It is the "use-oriented" research that will be primarily affected
by the patentability of microorganisms. Because the incentives of
the patent system operate primarily on the businessman and only
secondarily on the scientist,2' 3 it is unlikely private industry will
be interested in funding research projects that are not commercially exploitable. Thus, the patentability of microorganisms will
promote private genetic research directed towards development
of microorganisms for commercial introduction to the environment, or used in processes requiring much larger quantities than
are needed in non-use-oriented research. Inasmuch as use-oriented research involves a greater likelihood of eventual exposure
214
to the public, it warrants greater regulation.
ConstitutionalAspects
Arguably, there exists a constitutionally protected right to research. 2 15 If that right is a fundamental right, any regulations affecting that right must satisfy the compelling state interest,
substantial relation, and least restrictive alternative tests of enforceability.21 6 Protecting human life and health is a compelling
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Berger, supra note 163.
Grobstein, supra note 209, at 1191.
Berger, supra note 163.
See note 7 supra.
Grobstein, supra note 209, at 1196. This is not to say that non-use-oriented

research may not be regulated if it involves a "direct risk" of harm to the environ-

ment, but the greatest degree of danger exists in direct risks from use-oriented re-

search. Id. at 1191.
215. J. Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research and the Legitimacy of GovGENETICS AND THE LAW 1129 (A. Milunsky ed. 1980).
216. Spece, A Purposive Analysis of ConstitutionalStandards of JudicialReview and a PracticalAssessment of the Constitutionalityof Regulating RecombinantDNA Research, 51 S. CAT L. REV. 1281, 1285 (1978). The author suggests that
regulations of DNA research might be subjected to the rational relation or inter-

ernmental Regulation, in

mediate tests of scrutiny if the right to research is determined to be less than fundamentaL If the regulation can pass the compelling state interest test, however,

then a fortiori it can pass these other tests. Id. at 1332. See also note 207 supra.

state interest.2 17 The substantial relationship requirement will
probably be interpreted to refer to both the probability and the
degree of the physical danger that might be avoided by regulation. The probability and amount of harm will then be compared
to the degree of intrusion on the rights of the researchers.2 1 8
The remaining element is the regulation be the least restrictive
alternative. 2 19 This requires that the regulation not create overinclusive classifications to which the purpose of the enactment is
not relevant, and minimize the intrusion on the rights of those to
whom its purpose is relevant. 220 While it appears clear that under
the compelling state interest test an outright prohibition of recombinant DNA research would not be upheld, 22 ' it is not certain
exactly what regulations would be sustained. This is due to the
lack of adequate information regarding the magnitude and
probability of danger posed by recombinant DNA research as well
as uncertainty about the extent of the researcher's rights.222
There is, however, a greater certainty of enforceability of regulations governing use-oriented research, where a direct risk of harm
22 3
exists, than of regulations governing "pure" research.
The problem lies in designing regulations which minimize intrusions on the right to research while adequately protecting society from the risks of research by private industry. There are
several alternative approaches to congressional regulation of private research in recombinant DNA.224

Direct Regulation
First, Congress could draft legislation requiring compliance
with express guidelines and providing penalties for non-compliance. While this alternative would discourage private research involving those organisms determined to be dangerous, it has the
disadvantages of being overly rigid and of requiring inspection
2 25
and enforcement for its effectiveness.
Other alternatives are to apply the existing NIH Guidelines to
217. Id. at 1333. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
218. Spece, supra note 216, at 1335.
219. Id. at 1340.

220. Id.
221. Id. at 1351. An outright prohibition might be upheld under the rational relation test. See note 228 infra.
222. Id.
223. Grobstein, supra note 209, at 1194.
224. See notes 202-05 and accompanying text, supra.
225. Overly technical language in the statute might be difficult for the courts
and legislators to interpret, further diminishing the effectiveness of direct legislation. Berger, supra note 163, at 107.
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private research, 226 or to assign the task of designing and enforcing the regulations to an independent agency. 22 7 While these
methods have the advantage of increased flexibility, the inspection and enforcement problems remain. It is relatively certain,
however, that guidelines such as the NIH
Guidelines could satisfy
228
the strict scrutiny standard of review.
Diminishing Patent Incentives
Another approach is to diminish the incentives for private genetic research, or alternatively, to encourage voluntary compliance with the NIH Guidelines by manipulations of the patent
protection. For example, Congress could expressly limit or enumerate the types of organisms which would be patentable, a
method similar to that used in the Plant Patent Act.2 2 9 The regulation might provide that only organisms exempted from the NIH
230
Guidelines could be patented.
Prohibiting patents for inventions in hazardous fields is not a
novel idea. Under the 1954 Atomic Energy Act231 patents are prohibited for certain inventions related to nuclear research. 23 2 A
similar statute could minimize the potential hazards of private genetic research by encouraging research only with the less dangerous organisms. This approach has the advantage of being only a
minor intrusion on the right to research, but the disadvantage of
226. See, e.g., H.R. 11,192, supra note 200.
227. This method was used to assign to the Environmental Protection Agency
the task of drafting the Federal Toxic Substances Control Act. See 15 U.S.C-.A
§§ 2601-2629 (West Supp. 1980).
228. Spece, supra note 216, at 1349. It has been noted that the Supreme Court
has held environmental hazards are a matter of economic regulation and not individual liberty. Thus minimal scrutiny is likely to be applied to such regulations.
R. Stewart, Legal Regulation of EnvironmentalRisk, in GENETiCS

AND THE

LAw I,

404 (A. Milunsky ed. 1980) (citing Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978)).
229. For example, patents could be limited to microorganisms derived from
species not banned by the NIH Guidelines. It has been demonstrated that there is
an extraordinary correlation between mutagenic potency and carcinogenicity to
man. Thus research on mutagens and carcinogens should be restricted. S.
Lederberg, Public Control of Genetic Research, in GENETICS AND THE LAW 1[ 42 (A.
Milunsky ed. 1980). See Note, Living Matter Found to be Patentable: In re
Chakrabarty, 11 CoNN. I. REV. 311 (1979).
230. See NIH Guidelines, supra note 85, at 60,130.
231. Act of August 30, 1954, ch. 13, 68 Stat 943 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2181
(1976)).
232. See Note, Ownership of Living Inventions-In re Bergy, 29 DE PAu- I
REV. 205, 233 n.124 (1979).

depending on the assumption that private industry will only conduct research with organisms which they eventually intend to
patent.233
As an alternative, the regulation might provide that no patents
for microorganisms or processes related to recombinant DNA research will be issued to any research firm or institution unless
NIH Guidelines are followed. 234 This has both the advantage and
disadvantage of relying on voluntary compliance with the NIH
23 5
Guidelines.
There are several major advantages to patent incentive manipulation. The intrusion on academic freedom would be minimal because non-use-oriented research would be unaffected. Congress
could avoid problems in drafting technical regulatory legislation.
The fiscal impact would be minimal because no enforcement
would be necessary. The disadvantage of incentive based regulations is that rather than comply voluntarily with the guidelines, or
rather than conduct research only with patentable organisms, the
private research firms might resort to trade secrecy. Unless the
new microorganism or process could be discovered by reverse engineering, the public could be denied valuable information concerning the invention. 236 Congress could, however, require prior
public disclosure of all private genetic research so as to assure
public safety. 23 7 Even though it might preclude patentability,

such a measure could be necessary until the dangers of genetic
research are eliminated or disproved.23 8
Testing for Safety
Rather than require disclosure, Congress could require the organism be proven safe before it is mass produced or exposed to
233. See text accompanying notes 213-14 supra.
234. This is similar to the provision of S. 621, note 200 supra, except that S. 621
required all applicable guidelines be followed and at present there are no guidelines applicable to private genetic research. See notes 171, 179-84 and accompany-

ing text supra.
235. The advantage being that the intrusion on the rights of the researchers is
minimized. The disadvantage is that researchers only need comply if they intend
to seek patents. The regulation would have to provide for a requirement that the
NIH Guidelines be followed for a certain period prior to the patent application.
236. "Reverse engineering" is the technique of analyzing a commercially available product to determine the process involved in its production. While it is an
accepted method for discovering trade secrets, it is virtually impossible to implement with genetically engineered organisms. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416
U.S. 470, 476 (1974); Guttag, supra note 24, at 277; Note, The Patentabilityof Living
Organisms Under 35 U.S.C. § 101: Parker v. Bergy (Parker v. Chakrabarty), 15
NEw ENG. L. REV. 379, 404-05 (1980).
237. Note, Living Matter Found to be Patentable: In re Chakrabarty, 11 CoN.
L. RE V. 311, 326 n.58 (1979).
238. Id.
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the public.239 When a technology is potentially dangerous, or its
safety even questionable, it might legitimately be prohibited or
regulated until the researcher can demonstrate that no unreasonable danger exists. 240 Although this method would serve the purpose of protecting the public from exposure to a dangerous
organism, it would do so only after the research is complete and
the organism is ready for the market. It would have no effect on
the adoption of proper laboratory techniques, nor would it discourage research with dangerous organisms not intended to be
marketed.241
Liability Insurance/Strict Liability
An approach that has been suggested for general applicability
to genetic research 242 is the enactment of a statute similar to the
Price-Anderson Act.2 43 Congress would require all private genetic
research firms carry a certain minimum amount of liability insurance and be held strictly liable for injuries caused by theif research. 244 This principle could also be applied as a condition
precedent only to those firms seeking patent protection. The
main defect of such an insurance approach is that while it provides relief to victims it does not provide a complete remedy nor
prevent what may be irreparable environmental harm caused by
a biohazard. It does, however, provide a general deterrent to dangerous research through a market mechanism requiring little governmental intervention. 245
CONCLUSION

The task of balancing the competing costs and benefits of ge239. This could be done by analogizing to the Toxic Substances Act, 15 U.S.C_.A
§§ 2601-2629 (West Supp. 1980), and the National Environmental Policy Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976). Berger, supra note 163, at 100.
240. Id. Accord Cohen, Restriction of Research with Recombinant DNA: The
Dangersof Inquiry and the Burden of Proof, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1081 (1978); Hutt,
supra note 179, at 1439.
241. For example, an organism used in a process that produces a marketable
product.
242. See S. 621, note 200 supra.
243. Pub. L, No. 85-256, § 4, 71 Stat 576 (1957) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2210
(1976)).
244. Friedman, supra note 203, at 1377.
245. C. Damme, Controlling Environmental Mutagens: Through Market Incentives or State Action?, in GENETICS AND THE LAw 1 382 (A. Milunsky ed. 1980).

netic research to society is a complex one, requiring detailed examination and carefully constructed legislation. The difficulty of
the situation is exacerbated by the need for immediate action to
mitigate the dangers inherent in unregulated, private genetic research. While the prohibition of all genetic research is too harsh
a protective measure, a certain degree of coercion may be necessary to ensure private industry cooperation with government
guidelines. As the Supreme Court noted in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty,24 6 merely denying patents probably will not forestall private genetic research. 47 Yet it is equally clear that extending patents to products of genetic research will not enhance
public safety.
The courts are not without the means to deny patent incentives
to private genetic research. Patents on microorganisms could be
refused based on the ambiguity of the relationship of the Plant
Patent Act and the patent statutes. The microorganism could be
characterized as embodying a phenomenon of nature, even if the
phenomenon is not displayed in nature. 24 The patent could also
be denied on the basis of the preemption doctrine. Until such
time as legislation is drafted by Congress, the courts should refrain from encouraging unregulated, private research in recombinant genetics, keeping in mind the threat such research poses to
society.
While none of the regulations suggested would provide a perfect solution to the problem created by the Supreme Court's decision to encourage unregulated genetic research, they would
provide a measure of safety during what must be a short period
before Congress acts to provide more comprehensive legislation.
Congress may decide not to extend patent protection to the products of genetic research. If so, as the Supreme Court has suggested, the research would continue through the encouragement
of the profit motive. Thus merely denying patent protection is insufficient. The most effective solution to the problem would be a
combination of the regulatory and patent incentive approaches.
Congress should create an agency responsible for the development of regulations governing genetic research, or allocate such
power to the Environmental Protection Agency, and provide that
agency with the funds and power to enforce its guidelines. As
part of this scheme, to penalize noncompliance, no patents should
issue to firms or institutions that fail to comply with the regula246. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 100 S. Ct. 2204, 2204 (1980).
247. Supra notes 90-91.
248. Supra note 33.
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tions. Until such regulation can be enacted, Congress should act
to apply the NIH Guidelines to all genetic research.
JAMES F. BRASHEAR

